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Wendel: Monroe Freedman: The Ethicist of the Non-Ideal

MONROE FREEDMAN:
THE ETHICIST OF THE NON-IDEAL
W Bradley Wendel*
Monroe Freedman was a severe critic of "philosophizing" about
legal ethics,' yet he was one of the most influential theorists in the
development of theoretical legal ethics as an academic discipline in the
late twentieth century. No philosopher can ignore Monroe's arguments,
many of which are as vital today as when he first articulated them. It is
not just the arguments themselves that remain influential, however, but
also a style of reasoning that is characteristic of legal argument at its
best. Philosophers not steeped in the ethical world of practicing lawyers
have a tendency to assume away many of the hard problems. For
example, a dilemma may be presented on the assumption that a lawyer
"knows" some fact-that the client is lying and will lie on the stand, that
the adversary's inexperienced lawyer has made a mistake, that a
defendant was wrongfully convicted, and so on. One of the great virtues
of Monroe's work is its lawyer-like insistence on the centrality of facts
and the difficulty of knowing what they actually are. It is easy to say that
a lawyer should provide competent assistance and should keep a client's
confidences, but also a lawyer should not assist in presenting perjured
testimony.2 Using one of his vivid examples, however, Monroe
reminded us that a lawyer will not know the facts needed to provide
competent representation without first giving the client an ironclad
guarantee of confidentiality, which limits the lawyer's options in

* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am grateful to Alice Woolley for ongoing
discussions about Monroe's life and work. The author gratefully acknowledges the research funding
provided by the Judge Albert Conway Memorial Fund for Legal Research, established by the
William C. and Joyce C. O'Neil Charitable Trust to the honor the memory of Judge Conway, Chief
Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals from 1954 to 1959 and his son, Hewitt A. Conway, a
member of the Cornell Law School Class of 1949.
1. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, A CritiqueofPhilosophizing About Lawyers'Ethics,
25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91 (2012).
2. This is the famous "trilemma" from his best-known article. See Monroe H. Freedman,
Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64
MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469-70, 1175-80 (1966).
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responding to the client's subsequent decision to testify falsely.' Imagine
that a woman is accused of stabbing her husband to death with a kitchen
knife. The client insisted that she had not committed the crime, despite
overwhelming physical evidence of guilt. Only after the lawyer pressed
the client, and reassured her that nothing she told him would ever be
disclosed or used against her, did the client reveal that her husband was a
mean drunk who had abused her many times in the past. On the occasion
of the death, he came home drunk and violent, attacked her again, and as
she backed away from him she felt the kitchen knife and stabbed him in
self-defense. Of course, this is a complete defense to the murder charge
and, armed with this information, the lawyer could easily persuade the
prosecutor to dismiss the charges.
It is hard to imagine a philosopher disagreeing with the value of
zealous representation in the self-defense case, but Monroe's point was
that a lawyer engaged in ethical deliberation about the same case would
see connections a philosopher might miss.4 The relationship between
confidentiality and competence is fairly easy to perceive. A defense
lawyer would not be able to learn valuable information if it were first
necessary to give a Miranda warning,' so to speak, cautioning the client
that any information disclosed by the client might have to be shared with
law enforcement. The deeper relationship, however, is between
confidentiality and the ethical demand that lawyers not participate in
presenting false testimony at trial. 6 A defense lawyer who needs to know
all the facts in order to represent a client competently may subsequently
find herself in a real jam if the client insists on testifying to a version of
events that is at odds with the story the client told the lawyer. To avoid
getting into this predicament, the lawyer may begin the representation
with a commitment to avoid learning all the relevant, potentially
incriminating facts. That way, whichever story the client chooses to tell
on the stand (assuming the client invokes the constitutional right to
testify),' the lawyer can plausibly claim that she did not know it was
false.' Voild, the lawyer is off the hook for discipline, but the client will

3. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 6.02,
at 152-53 (4th ed. 2010).
4. See generally Freedman, supranote 1.
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426, 467-73 (1966).
6.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(2) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2014).

7. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,49-53 (1987).
8. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") requires the lawyer to take
remedial action only when the lawyer subsequently comes to know that evidence offered or
testimony by a witness called by the lawyer is false. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
r. 3.3(a)(3). Knowledge is defined in the Model Rules as actual (that is, subjective) knowledge. Id.
r. 1.0(f).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss3/7

2

Wendel: Monroe Freedman: The Ethicist of the Non-Ideal

2016]

MONROE FREEDMAN: THE ETHICIST OF THE NON-IDEAL

673

be less well served. Inventive defense lawyers have come up with all
manners of clever work-arounds to avoid acquiring the kind of
knowledge that will limit their freedom of action. Famed Texas defense
lawyer Richard "Racehorse" Haynes, for instance, has said he "never
[asks] the client what it is that he contends are the facts from his point of
view .. . in order to avoid being 'compromised' in deciding whether to
put him on the witness stand."' Instead, Haynes asks "what [the client]
suspects the other side might claim.""o Sophisticated clients have no
trouble figuring out what they are supposed to say, and, thus, do not lose
any of the benefits of effective advocacy, but Monroe rightly questioned
whether such an obvious ruse is really an ethical solution to the
problem." It would be better, he contended, to clearly and candidly give
lexical priority to the values of loyalty, confidentiality, and competence
in the attorney-client relationship over what should be seen as
secondary duties to the tribunal and to the system of justice.12 That
means if the lawyer cannot successfully dissuade the client from
testifying falsely, she should present the client's testimony in the
ordinary way, not relying on the "narrative" fiction to distance the
lawyer's questioning from the client's perjury and not making any
retrospective efforts at rectifying the record."
This is the position that got Monroe in such hot water with
professional elites when the lecture that became his "Three Hardest
Questions" article was first publicized. Then-Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals Chief Judge, Warren Burger, along with two other federal
judges, actually initiated disbarment proceedings against Monroe for
having expressed opinions they believed to be in conflict with a lawyer's
ethical duties." But, in fact, all Monroe's position, from which he never
wavered, boils down to is, something has got to give-the only question
is what. There is no tidy solution to the perjury trilemma that avoids
compromising either loyal client service or the duty to screen out false
evidence and perjured testimony." In the years following the publication
of the article and the ensuing controversy, Monroe never tired of
pointing out the contortions that courts and disciplinary agencies went
9. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reporter's Notebook: Defending Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1981,
at 16.
10. LEO KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES
OF THE LAw 44 (1996).
11. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 6.08, at 162.
12. Id. § 6.03, at 154.
13. Freedman, supranote 2, at 1477-78.
14. See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perfjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 133, 133-34, 133 n.1, 136-38 (2008) (recounting this history).
15. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 6.03, at 153-54.
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through to avoid facing up to this problem. Consider the knowledge
requirement. In the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and in
many civil perjury cases, a fact finder can infer from circumstantial
evidence the conclusion that a lawyer had subjective knowledge of
falsity.' 6 Numerous cases involving criminal defense lawyers, however,
hold that it is almost impossible to satisfy the knowledge requirement to
trigger a defense lawyer's remedial obligations." The Wisconsin
Supreme Court went as far as to say: "Absent the most extraordinary
circumstances, such knowledge must be based on the client's expressed
admission of intent to testify untruthfully." Since it is only the thickestheaded client who will frankly admit to an intention to testify falsely,
this interpretation of the knowledge requirement aligns state courts in
Wisconsin exactly with the position that Monroe advocated almost fifty
years ago.
Many other courts have taken the same position," leaving the
substance of the law as Monroe said it should be, only buried beneath
pious denunciations of perjury. To return to Monroe's criticism of the
strategy of willful ignorance, is this really an ethical solution? I believe
the answer is yes, but on a conception of ethics that is more familiar to
lawyers than to philosophers. Over and over again, Monroe insisted on
the importance of context to ethical decision-making. Speaking of the
critics of his "Three Hardest Questions" article, he ascribed their
objections to a style of reasoning that could not break free of rigid,
categorical rules or principles:
Their system of professional responsibility appears to rest upon rigidly
legalistic adherence to norms, regardless of the context in which the
lawyer may be acting, his motives, and the consequences of his
act .... The system of professional responsibility that I have been
advancing in these articles, on the other hand, has been one that

16. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014); see United States v.
Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1993); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
r. 4.2, cmt. 8 (warning, in the context of the anti-contact rule, that avoiding a knowing violation of
the rule cannot be evaded by the lawyer "closing eyes to the obvious").
17. See, e.g., United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2003); Shade v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
18. State v. McDowell, 681 N.W.2d 500, 513 (Wis. 2004).
19. See, e.g., Midgett, 342 F.3d at 326 (noting "defense counsel's responsibility to his client
was not dependent on whether he personally believed [defendant]" and holding that defense
counsel's "mere belief' was not sufficient to refuse defendant's need for assistance in testifying);
United States v. Long, 857 F.2d 436, 445 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that a clear intent to commit
perjury is necessary for an attorney to break confidence).
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attempts to deal with ethical problems in context, giving full
consideration both to motive and consequences. 20
Much later, he returned to the same theme, criticizing the formalistic,
rule-bound style of reasoning that lawyers and judges sometimes employ
when dealing with the rules of professional conduct: "I would like,
therefore, to venture beyond the words of the ethical rules themselves,
into the larger legal context of the lawyers' role, into understanding
inconsistent ethical rules in the light of reason, into the purposes of legal
representation in criminal cases, and into moral philosophy."2 1
The answer to an ethical question often depends on contextual factors
not easily captured by general rules. For example, suppose a judge
says to a defense lawyer, "Let's speed this up-tell me, did your
client do it?" 22 If the lawyer answers truthfully, she betrays a client
confidence, but if she equivocates or refuses to answer, the judge will
take that response to be a tacit admission of the client's guilt. Given that
the judge had no right to ask the question in the first place, and has
placed the lawyer in an untenable position, Monroe said the "right"
answer is for the lawyer to respond, "Your Honor, I have no doubt that
the defendant is not guilty."23
The emphasis on a holistic, purposivist style of interpretation over a
rigid, categorical, and formalist approach in legal ethics is not unique to
Monroe. It also characterizes the work of one of the frequent targets of
his criticism, Bill Simon.24 What very strongly distinguished Monroe's
approach, however, was his resistance to the idea that there might be tidy
solutions to difficult conflicts among ethical values.25 Lawyers know and
philosophers sometimes forget, hard ethical questions do not always
have answers so clearly justified that the agent feels no sense of conflict
or regret with respect to the unchosen option. We would like it to be the
case that the resolution of an apparent dilemma is either "do X" or "do
not do X," and in either case to feel no sense of loss with respect to the
alternative. But consider the analysis of the perjury trilemma and the
improper question by the judge. Telling lawyers either to flat-out lie to a
judge or to knowingly introduce perjured testimony is the kind of

20.

Monroe H. Freedman, Postscript: The Professional Responsibility of the Prosecuting

Attorney, 55 GEO. L.J. 1030, 1046-47 (1967).
21.

Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation-Lying to Judges,

Deceiving Third Parties,and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 774 (2006).
22. See id at 773.
23. Id.
24. See generally William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv.
1083 (1988).
25. See supratext accompanying notes 19-20.
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uncompromising stance that riled up Monroe's critics. The alternatives,
on the other side, would be just as troubling-a fact that critics often
prefer to gloss over. Robust duties to screen out perjury necessarily
result in lawyers betraying client confidences or engaging in some kind
of strategy of willful ignorance. Either way, when thinking about the
perjury trilemma and the problem of the impertinent questions by
judges, it is difficult to avoid a sense that the unchosen alternative also
had a great deal to be said in its favor. Presenting the testimony of a
defendant who will almost certainly be lying may be the least-worst
outcome of a difficult situation, but it is not straightforwardly the right
result. Dilemmas in political life, of which (I contend) the practice of
law is a part, are sometimes incapable of resolution without a sense that
there is something disagreeable, even wrongful, about the resolution,
even though the conclusion may be justified.26 There may be no
"innocent" resolution in which an agent takes all the relevant
considerations into account, engages in the right process of weighing
and balancing, and leaves no residue or remainder of value
unacknowledged.27 Thus, a lawyer ought to reason to the best resolution
of the competing values at stake-for instance, loyalty to the client, but
also obligations to the tribunal-and act on that resolution, but should
also be aware of the remainder or residue of the competing values. A
lawyer should be aware that her work sometimes involves getting her
hands dirty, as it is sometimes called. It may be impossible to do the
right thing without, at the same time, engaging in moral wrongdoing.
Many philosophers find this position deeply confused, and even
incoherent.2 8 Moral reasoning should yield a conclusion regarding what
should be done, all things considered. The competing considerations
weighing in favor of alternative courses of action are taken into account
in deliberation, but once a conclusion is reached, they cease to have any
significance for the agent. A decision may be difficult, depend on
contextual factors, call for the exercise of judgment, and not simply be
given straightforwardly by abstract principles; still however, there is, in
principle, only one right answer. The unchosen options do not linger and
create "moral remainders."29 An agent may experience sentiments of
26. See, e.g., BERNARD WILLIAMS, Politics and Moral Character, in MORAL LUCK 64
(1981); Michael Walzer, PoliticalAction: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160,
165-66 (1973).
27. CHRISTOPHER W. GOWANS, INNOCENCE LOST: AN EXAMINATION OF INESCAPABLE
MORAL WRONGDOING 90-91 (1994).
28. See C.A.J. Coady, The Problem of Dirty Hands, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 29,
2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/dirty-hands (reviewing criticism of the
dirty hands thesis).
29. See GOWANS, supra note 27, at 90-91 (defending the view that moral values have some
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remorse or regret, but the presence of these emotions does not indicate
wrongdoing. I disagree with this view, mainstream though it may be,
because I believe moral remainders may point to residual wrongdoing
even though the action taken was justified.30 The purpose of this brief
Tribute, however, is not to re-argue an issue within moral and political
philosophy, but to suggest an explanation for the staying power and
continuing significance of Monroe's scholarship on the lawyer's role.
One of the themes that animated so much of Monroe's work is that the
role of the lawyer necessarily touches on values that are always in
tension and sometimes in outright conflict. Lawyers represent
individuals within a system of justice, and as such, they are subject to
the demands of both individual and political morality. The demands of
loyalty to one's client are not always congruent with the demands of
justice, nor can they be, because sometimes the realization of social
justice would require the betrayal of one's client's confidences and, on
the other hand (as every lawyer knows), there are cases in which doing
the best job for one's client results in an unjust outcome. This is not a
particularly original observation, but the power of Monroe's decadeslong engagement with legal ethics comes from his refusal to abstract
away from the particulars of real cases, in which there seem that every
alternative involves the compromise of some core value. In other words,
to borrow from the title of Stuart Hampshire's magnificent book,
Monroe's voice is that of experience, not innocence:
[T]hose who incur the responsibility of political power . . should at all
times be prepared for the occurrence of an uncontrolled conflict of
duties in situations which seem to exclude the possibility of a decent
outcome, and in which all lines of action seem dishonourable or
blameworthy. This is the point at which the contrast between
innocence and experience becomes indispensable in ethics. The idea of
experience is the idea of guilty knowledge, of the expectation of
unavoidable squalor and imperfection, of necessary disappointments
and mixed results, of half success and half failure. 31
When considering some of the hardest cases lawyers must deal with
in practice, the perspective of innocence has less to offer than the
standpoint of experience. In particular, it better acknowledges the
inevitability of wrongdoing. In the much-debated example of cross-

independence from deliberative conclusions and defining a "moral remainder" as "something that
remains of a moral conflict after the process of moral deliberation and that thereby explains the
presence of wrongdoing even when the correct conclusion of deliberation has been followed").
30. See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAw 171-73 (2010).
31. STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 170 (1989).
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examining the alleged victim in a rape case,32 the conflict between
the possibility that an innocent defendant may be sent to jail for
most of the remainder of his life and the humiliation and anguish
inflicted on the complaining witness is incapable of resolution
without moral remainders. There is little to hope for in such a case
beyond "the expectation of unavoidable squalor and imperfection,"" but
an ethical theory should nevertheless be prepared to provide guidance in
these circumstances.
It would be one thing to theorize about an area of social life in
which almost everyone accepts principles ofjustice, complies with them,
and helps support just institutions. When individuals and institutions fail
to live up to the demands of justice, however, ideal theories have little to
contribute. If judges never asked questions they should not, if witnesses
never lied or were mistaken, if police officers did not commit perjury, if
all defendants had access to competent and dedicated defense lawyers,
and if prosecutors complied with their constitutional obligations to turn
over exculpatory evidence, then we could make do with an ideal theory
of the defense lawyer's role. Where other actors partially or completely
fail to comply with principles of justice, however, a different theoretical
approach is required-a non-ideal theory. I am using this term slightly
differently from the way it is normally used by Rawls and others,34 but
the underlying idea is the same. We can distinguish a theory that
assumes our institutions and practices are the best for which we can
realistically hope from one that takes institutional injustice as given and
seeks to derive principles for actors within the system in light of this
injustice. What is the required (or permitted) response from defense
lawyers to prosecutorial misconduct? What about the response of all
lawyers to unjust laws? Importantly, the answer to any question along
these lines, within non-ideal theory, is given by the content of ideal
theory.35 That sounds confusing, but it means that the moral
permissibility of a policy, rule of conduct, or action is judged as a step
toward the achievement of an integrated ideal of justice. Non-ideal
theory is a transitional perspective, not the passive acceptance of a
32. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supranote 3, § 7.12, at 207-08; id. § 7.14, at 212. Monroe's coauthor, Professor Abbe Smith, has separately addressed the case of a New York City police officer
accused of having violently assaulted Haitian immigrant Abner Louima in a police stationhouse, in
which the defense lawyer suggested that Louima's horrific injuries at the hands of the cop could
have resulted from consensual homosexual activities. See Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The
Casefor UnmitigatedZeal on BehalfofPeople Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REv. 925,
925, 930-31 (2000).
33.

HAMPSHIRE, supra note 31, at 170.

34. See A. John Simmons, Ideal andNonideal Theory, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 7 (2010).
35. Id. at 18.
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second-best outcome.36 As Adam Swift explains: "[A]s long as
philosophers can tell us why the ideal would be ideal, and not simply
that it is, much of what they actually do when they do 'ideal theory' is
likely to help with the evaluation of options within the feasible set.""
This leads to a concluding observation about an aspect of Monroe's
ethical theory that has come under criticism-his uncompromising
defense of the adversary system on constitutional grounds, which carries
with it a strong obligation of zealous advocacy for attorneys. 3 8 He
imagines an idealized system, in which clients are represented by loyal,
competent, and dedicated lawyers who single-mindedly advocate for
their clients' best interests.39 Of course, the legal system also aims at
social values such as truth and justice, but these will be produced by the
adversary system, as long as all the parties' lawyers fulfill their role of
zealously advocating for their clients.40 A rosy description of the
American adversarial system is an inviting target for critics, who argue
that ethical norms for lawyers cannot be defended with reference to such
a flawed system.4 1 Perhaps a different way to understand Monroe's
reliance on the adversary system is as a regulative ideal that operates
within a fundamentally non-ideal ethical theory. The values that inform
ethical lawyering in the real world are those that can be understood by
starting with a "realistic utopia."4 2 It may be utopian to imagine that all
citizens really do have an equal opportunity to have their rights,
humanity, and dignity respected by the legal system, and to have a loyal,
dedicated, competent lawyer serving them as their "champion against a
hostile world."43 If there ever were to be anything approaching a realistic
utopia, however, we are only going to get there if lawyers act on the
values of equality and dignity, which are at the heart of Monroe's
conception of the adversary system.4 We are more likely to end up in an
ideal world by keeping the individual rights of our clients at the center of
our ethical vision than by subordinating the humanity and dignity of our
clients to social ends such as truth and justice.

&

36. Id. at 22-25.
37. Adam Swift, The Value of Philosophy in Nonideal Circumstances, 34 Soc. THEORY
PRAC. 363, 365 (2008).
38.
at 21.
39.
40.
41.

See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 21, at 772; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3,

§ 2.04,

See generally Freedman,supra note 21.
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 3, § 2.10, at 33-35.
See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN

DIGNITY 21 (2007) (arguing that a lawyer's accountability for unethical actions does not depend on
the adversary system, and the adversary system is not a sufficient basis for unaccountability).
42. Simmons, supranote 34, at 7.
43.

FREEDMAN & SMITH, supranote 3,

§ 2.03,

at 20.

44. Id. § 2.04, at 20-21.
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If he could read this, Monroe might object to my redirection from
his lawyerly arguments, based on the American Constitution and
adversarial system, toward an analysis drawn from political philosophy.
He and others rightly ask how much philosophers have to teach lawyers
about their own ethical duties, particularly since philosophers tend to
work with fantastical thought experiments, do not pay sufficient
attention to empirical facts, and seek truths that are necessary and do not
depend on factual contingencies.4 5 Many factors explain the lasting value
of Monroe's scholarship, not the least of which is its insistence on taking
the full complexity of the real world of legal practice into account when
seeking to prescribe ethical norms for lawyers. At the same time,
however, his work is philosophical in the best sense. It articulates and
defends a vision of ethical lawyering that has stood the test of time.
Plenty of scholars (myself included) have criticized the zealous
advocacy conception of lawyering, but in so doing, have always felt
constrained to hold onto the values of humanity and dignity that animate
all of Monroe's work. Philosophers and lawyers alike will continue to
debate these issues, largely in terms set by Monroe in the 1970s, as long
as there is a field of legal ethics.

45. See, e.g., M.B.E. Smith, Should Lawyers Listen to PhilosophersAbout Legal Ethics?, 9 L.
& PHIL. 67, 71-79 (1990).
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